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RECENT CASES

four dissenting justices indicate their desire to retain the direct burden test
originally followed and recently returned to in the Freeman and Carter &
Weeks decisions.
Since Justice Burton did not express his view on the most desirable approach to the problem, the case presents no clear answer to this perplexing
problem. The stand taken by those affirming the validity of the tax does indicate
that there is serious consideration of again discarding the original direct burden
test.
HENRY T. JONES.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN

IMPOSING SENTENCE

Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree. Although the
jury recommended life imprisonment, the trial judge imposed the death sentence
after considering additional information obtained through the court's probation
department, "and through other sources" as prescribed by the New York Criminal Code pre-sentencing procedure statutes.l Counsel for the defendant contended
that, as construed and applied, the controlling statutes were in violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, "in that the sentence of death was based upon information supplied by witnesses with whom the accused had not been confronted and as to
whom he had no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal." 2 On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court held that the protection of the due process
clause applies where the question for consideration is the guilt of the defendant,
but a judge in imposing sentence may exercise a wide discretion in the sources
and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of
punishment to be imposed within the limits fixed by law. The verdict and sentence
of the trial court were accordingly affirmed. Williams v. People of the State of
New York, 337 U. S.241, 69 Sup. St. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1008 (1949).
The Court reasoned that a sentencing judge is not confined to the narrow
issue of guilt, and the reasons behind the rules of evidence which apply to
criminal trials on the issue of guilt are not present when determining the sentence
to be imposed. The Court observed that sentencing judges have long exercised
this wide discretion, and it is highly relevant-if not essential-to their exercise
of discretion in selecting an appropriate sentence that they possess the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant's life and character. The due process clause, according to the opinion, should not be treated as a uniform command
that the courts throughout the nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking
information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more en1.

(The court cites N.Y. Crim. Code sec. 482). The available statute is (N.Y.) McK.
Crim. Code 1939 see. 482: " * 0 * Before rendering judgment or pronouncing
sentence the court shall cause the defendant's previous criminal record to be submitted to it, including any reports that may have been made as a result of a
mental, psychiatric or physical examinations of such person, and may seek any
information that will aid the court in determining the proper treatment of such
defendant."
2. Williams v. People of N.Y., 337 U. S. 241, 69 Sup. Ct. 1079, 1081, 93 L. Ed. 1008

(1949).
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lightened and just sentence. Justice Rutledge and Justice Murphy dissented, on
the ground that due process of law includes at least the requirement that a
person accused of a crime shall be accorded a fair hearing throughout all stages
of the proceedings against him.
The majority opinion in the instant case follows the widely accepted rule
that where a statute gives wide latitude to the court or the jury in the matter
of fixing sentence, the defendant's background, occupation and past criminal
record are elements which demand consideration in determining the proper
sentence.3
In recent years many courts have held it to be the duty of the sentencing
judge to look into matters of mitigation and aggravation before pronouncing
sentence,$ while others using less compelling language have held it to be a proper
exercise of judicial discretion.5
A federal court in the sixth circuit, 6 and state courts in Pennsylvania7, and
South Carolina 8 while refusing to reverse lower court decisions because of the
methods used in obtaining information as to aggrevating and mitigating circumstances, have by way of dictum stated that such information should be obtained
through proceedings in open court in the presence of the defendant, and the
9
ordinary rules of evidence should be adhered to, especially where the defendant
has been convicted of murder and is to be sentenced to either life imprisonment
or death.10
The South Carolina Supreme Court in 1948 held that statements coming
11
under the ban of the hearsay rule would not be admissable for this purpose.
A California court, in 1945,12 held that such facts as were not obtained from
the probation officer's reports and the record of the trial, should have been
obtained from witnesses called in open court and in the presence of the defendant.
The court reversed in this case because the trial court, in imposing the sentence,
had been influenced by information received out of court.
3. Dalhover v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 355 (C.C.A. 7th 1938); United States v.
Minoru Yasui, 51 F. Supp. 234 (D. Ore. 1943) ; State v. Smith, 66 Ariz. 376, 189 P.
143, 177 N. E. 739, 77 A.LR. 1199
(2d) 205 (1948); People v. Popescue, 345 Ill.
(1931) ; State v. Miller 57 Ga. App. 349, 197 S. E. 310 (1938).

4. Kopp v. United States, 55 F. (2d) 878 (C.C.A. 7th 1932); United States v. Minoru
Yasui, 51 F. Supp. 234 (D. Ore. 1943) ; Ishkanian v. United States, 35 A. (2d) 176
(App. D. C. 1943) ; State v. Moody, 67 Ariz. 74, 190 P. (2d) 920 (1948) ; State v.
Smith, 66 Ariz. 376, 189 P. (2d) 205 (1948) ; James v. State, 53 Ariz. 42, 84 P.
(2d) 1081 (1938). Contra, State v. Vennum, 149 Wash. 670, 272 P. 62 (1928), where
the court said, "When a court is prepared to pass sentence, there is no requirement
that it shall take testimony to assist it in arriving at its judgment. It may, if it so
desires; but that is a matter for the trial court alone to decide."
S. Comm. of Penn. ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, Warden, 302 U.S. 51, 58 Sup. Ct. 59, 82
L. Ed. 43 (1937) ; Hunter v. United States, 149 F. (2d) 710 (C.C.A. 6th 1945);
Stobble v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 69 (C.C.A. 7th 1937) ; Bush v. People, 68 Colo.
218, 187 P. 528 (1920) ; People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A.L.R. 1199
(1931) ; State v. Reeder, 79 S.C. 139, 60 S.E. 434 (1908).
6. See Stephan v. United States, 133 F. (2d) 87 (C.C.A. 6th 1943).
7. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349, 35 A. (2d) 312 (1944).
S. See State v. Brodie, 213 S.C. 339, 49 S.E. (2d) 575 (1948).
9. Ibid.
10. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348, Pa. 349, 35 A. (2d) 312 (1944).
11.
12.

See State v. Brodie, 213 S.C. 339, 49 S.E. (2d) 575, 577 (1948).
People v. Giles, 70 Cal. App. (2d) 872, 161 P. (2d) 623 (1945).
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The South Carolina Supreme Court, in the case of Simms v. State,13 remanded for resentence because the sentencing judge had heard, in his chambers,
statements made against the defendant by people from the defendant's home
community.
Although there appear to be no decisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court
on the exact point, there are several Wyoming statutes which, added together,
indicate that in this State the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the instant
case would be followed. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Sec. 10-1406 confers upon
"any person convicted * * * of any offense punishable either in whole or in
part by fine" a right to move the court to hear testimony in mitigation of the
sentence. This section if taken together with Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Secs. 9-106
and 9-107, which give the court discretion to impose a fine as part of the punishment for any felony or misdemeanor, would seem to give the court discretion
to hear testimony in mitigation in any criminal case. Sec. 10-1406 also declares
it to be a "duty of the prosecuting attorney to attend such proceedings on behalf
of the state and to offer any testimony necessary to give the court a true understanding of the case." This wording tends to infer that some sort of a proceeding
is indicated where at least the named persons should be present. Wyo. Comp.
Stat. 1945 Sec. 10-1902 provides that the court may direct the county attorney
to conduct an investigation as to the circumstances of the offense, and the criminal
record, social history and present condition of the defendant and submit this
information to the court in writing along with the findings of any physical and
mental examinations. This sectiondoes not state specifically that such information
may be used in mitigation or aggravation of defendant's sentence, but it does
provide that this information shall be used in determining whether or not the
defendant shall be put on probation or whether or not the trial or sentence should
be suspended, and that it shall be used by the institution to which the defendant
is committed and by the board of charities and reform. In light of this provision
it must necessarily follow that such information, where used for the prescribed
purpose, would have an effect upon the judge in his exercise of discretion in imposing the limits of the sentence as provided in Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Secs.
10-1801 and 9-105.
It is evident from a review of the cases that there is a wide divergence, not
only in the practice of sentencing and pre-sentencing procedure but also in the
underlying philosophy. The rationale of those cases which hold that a trial
judge's discretion is not bound by the conventional rules of evidence, and the
protections of the due process clause, seems to be that there is and should be a
distinction between the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, and the process
of determining the extent of the punishment to be meted out within the limits
set by law.) 4 The Arizona Court in 1942,15 used these words in pointing out
this distinction: "The court . . . in determining the penalty to be imposed, is
13.

State v. Simms, 131 S.C. 422, 127 S.E. 840 (1925).

15.

State v. Levice, 59 Ariz. 472, 130 P. (2d)

14. See "The Admissibility of Character Evidence in Determining Sentence," 9 U. of
Chi. Law Rev. 715 (1942) for a historical development of discretionary sentence
statutes.
53 (1942).
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not bound by the strict rules of evidence applying to trials, but may consider many
matters not admissible on the issue of guilt or innocence, since such a proceeding
is not a trial in the ordinary sense of the word." Federal Courts in Ohio, 16 and
Illinois,1? and the Illinois Supreme Courtl8 have expressed this same view in
similar language.
Dr. Sheldon Glueck, the noted criminologist and penologist, Professor of
Criminal Law at Harvard University, has made a suggestion which might lead
to the most satisfactory solution to this problem. In his article, "Principles of
a Rational Penal Code,"1 9 Professor Glueck suggested that each state set up a
"Socio-Penal Commission" to be composed of trained specialists in the social
science field, which would take over after the trial court had rendered a verdict,
and through the use of scientific examinations and investigation determine the
psychiatric, social or peno-correctional treatment appropriate in each individual
case.
This type of procedure has been accepted by many states as a better means
of dealing with their juvenile delinquent and youth rehabilitation problems. In
2
California20 their commission is called The Youth Authority, and Minnesota 1
it is called the Youth Conservation Commission. While Professor Glueck's plan
is not limited to juvenile or youthful offenders, these programs are very definitely
a step in the right direction.
Such a plan as Professor Glueck's should satisfy those demanding a complete investigation in each case as well as those who object to any abandonment
by the courts of the evidentiary rules and due process protection, for the investigation and treatment commission would not be a part of the court, but merely
supplementary thereto.
DANIEL C. ROGERS, JR.

EAR INJURIES ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT
Appellee suffered permanent loss of hearing caused by the intensity of the
noise of long continued gunfire to which he was subjected in his employment
as a pistol range instructor from June, 1943 to December, 1944. Held that the
workman's injury should be considered "personal injury by accident" within the
meaning of the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act. The term accident must
be applied in its ordinary sense and to permit the progressive nature of each
shot's contribution to the injury to remove the case from the act, would be a
strict and technical interpetation unwarranted by the theoretical basis of the
compensation Act. Winkleman v. Boeing 4irplane, 166 Kan. 503, 203 P. (2d)
171 (1949).
16. Hunter v. United States, 149 F. (2d) 710 (C.C.A. 6th 1945).
17. Stobble v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 69 (C.C.A. 7th 1937) ; United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 155 F. 305 (N.D. 11. 1908).
333, 180 N.E. 832 (1932).
18. People v. McWilliams, 348 Ill.
19.
20.
21.

41 Harv. Law Rev. 453 (1928).
C. 1, Div. 25, Cal Welfare and Institutions Code.
Laws of Minnesota, Chapt. 595, 1027 (1947).

